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1.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Springfield’s students of color are experiencing something that the Constitution and laws of 
Massachusetts have long proclaimed intolerable: racially segregated schools.  The schools 
are segregated because the Commonwealth requires students to attend school in the 
communities where they reside, and those communities are segregated.  The state has a 
duty to remedy the ongoing denial of equal educational opportunity to Springfield’s 
students of color, and this proposal aims to hold it accountable for that duty.   
Devising policies that will produce integrated communities and schools is a task best suited 
for a diverse body of people with differing areas of expertise, rather than for a court.  The 
remit of the policy-making body should be: (1) to investigate and research the causes of 
segregation in and around Springfield; and (2) to formulate policies to minimize/eliminate 
it while fostering economic integration.  To give the resulting proposals a chance of success 
in the Legislature it is essential that the body that drafts them should be an official one with 
the driving force of the executive behind it.  This proposal describes a way establish that 
special commission if the Governor does not simply do so in response to a request.   
There is a state agency that has a legislative mandate to investigate discrimination, 
including its underlying historic causes, and to design high-leverage remedial policies.  
That agency is the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and it has 
the resources, as well as the duty, to take effective action.   Accordingly, I propose that a 
representative group of complainants file a class action with the MCAD and request that the 
agency recommend that the Governor set up a special commission to operate under the 
aegis of the MCAD.  There is no guarantee that the Legislature will enact the special 
commission’s proposals.  Nevertheless, this method promises to put before the General 
Court a coherent package of interlocking bills that have the imprimatur of the executive 
and significantly advance the public debate about how, not whether, we resume the task of 
building an integrated, inclusive, and just society. 
Several states have agencies similar to the MCAD, e.g. the New York Division of Human 
Rights, so this approach may be generalizable beyond Massachusetts.  In addition, because 
the likely solutions to segregation (e.g. greater regionalization, economic revitalization, 
human-scale redevelopment, public transportation, and fair housing) are also key elements 
in building a more just, equitable, sustainable society, organizations such as the Union of 
Minority Neighborhoods and the NAACP can use the MCAD action to make common cause 
with groups that do not fall within the traditional category of civil rights.  
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2.  INTRODUCTION 
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights promises equality.  Article 1 declares that 
“equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or 
national origin.” A racially segregated society falls short of that promise, and an education 
system that perpetuates segregation makes a mockery of it.  But for students of color who 
live in Springfield’s racially segregated neighborhoods the gap between their rights and 
their lived reality is enormous.  It shocks the conscience to think that in the second decade 
of the Twenty-first Century most students of color in Springfield, Massachusetts, attend 
schools that are segregated by race.   Forty years after the landmark case of Morgan v. 
Hennigan, our state remains home to a form of educational Jim Crow that reminds us that 
Massachusetts was the birthplace of the very phrase “separate but equal” (Roberts v. City of 
Boston; see also Meier, p. 163; Schneider, p. 144).  
We owe this state of affairs, in large part, to the principle of local schools, a principle which 
is written into state law.  By statute, Massachusetts assigns students to schools based on 
where they live.  Although the law creates a few exceptions to this principle (e.g. the Racial 
Imbalance Act, METCO, and the school choice program) most students in Massachusetts 
attend the school nearest to home.  Although racially neutral on its face, the statute is 
discriminatory in impact.  By enforcing this law, the Commonwealth confines generations 
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of our young people to racially segregated schools despite the fact that this outcome – 
segregated education – is clearly unconstitutional.    
One familiar path for those seeking greater equality in education is the school-funding 
route.  In Massachusetts, however, the Supreme Judicial Court has made clear that in the 
wake of the education reforms of the mid-1990s and the legislatively-managed framework 
for remedying inter-district financial disparities, school-funding cases are less likely to 
succeed (Hancock v. Commissioner for Education).  Accordingly, we need to identify another 
point of entry in order to force the state to address structural educational discrimination.  
For reasons I describe below, I propose persuading the Governor to appoint a special 
commission under MCAD supervision, using a legal case in the MCAD to do the persuading. 
In one important respect, the proposal resembles the Sheff v. O’Neill case, in which 
residents of Hartford, Connecticut, won a ruling that the state’s school-district lines led to 
the racial isolation of students of color in Hartford, violating their right to equal educational 
access.  As a result of the court ruling, Connecticut’s legislature instructed the state’s 
department of education to devise a remedial plan.  This proposal differs from Sheff, 
however, in that it involves (1) bringing the case in a specialized administrative agency, the 
MCAD, rather than in court; and (2) specifically asking for the Governor, as opposed to the 
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Legislature, to appoint a special commission; and (3) tasking the commission with 
developing policy proposals to end residential, not just educational, segregation.  I attach to 
the proposal two legal documents, namely a draft complaint and a memorandum of law in 
support of a request for a preliminary injunction.  They contain the claims and arguments 
that we would present to the MCAD, which I outline below. 
3.  OBJECTIVES 
This proposal’s objective is the elimination of racial segregation – both residential and 
educational – in and around Springfield.  The effects of residential segregation are most 
evident in the public schools, and one aspect of this proposal is to eliminate the racial and 
socio-economic disparities that combine to deny students of color their right to equality.  
Although per-pupil spending and teacher’s salaries in Springfield are relatively high, the 
graduation rate is only 53%, compared to a statewide rate of 82%.  These low graduation 
rates and high drop-out rates are strong signals that Springfield’s public schools are failing 
to teach students of color effectively (Greenleaf, et al).  There are three charter schools in 
Springfield and 45 non-charter public schools, ten of which are Level 4 schools.  A school 
qualifies for Level 4 status if it is “both low performing on the Massachusetts 
Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) over a four year period… and not showing 
signs of substantial improvement over that time” (Massachusetts Department of 
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Elementary & Secondary Education, 2011).  Most of the students in Springfield’s public 
schools are non-White.  Of the approximately 25,000 students, about 22% are African-
American/Black, 58% are Hispanic/Latino, and 15% are White.  About 84% of students are 
eligible for free or reduced priced lunch, significantly higher than the surrounding school 
districts and the state level of 34.2% (Greenleaf et al, citing School District Profiles, 2011).  
The degree of racial and socio-economic segregation in some schools is higher than in 
others, with predictable consequences for learning outcomes.  For example, in Springfield’s 
High School of Commerce – a Level 4 school – approximately 62% of the students are 
Hispanic and most students either have limited proficiency in English or do not speak 
English as their first language.  The 2010 drop-out rate among Commerce’s Hispanic 
students was 37.6% and among limited-English students it was 53.5% (Greenleaf, et al).   
Integrating our schools means simultaneously integrating our communities, an ultimate 
objective that is undeniably ambitious but nonetheless realistic so long as we take a 
regional approach.  Experience suggests that because “issues of environment, housing, 
education, taxes, transportation, and jobs are inextricably bound with space, land use, and 
race” (Ferris, Breakthrough Communities, p. 331) there is no single, simple measure that 
will undo generations of segregated housing.  But the way these issues overlap creates 
multiple policy windows, points of entry, and opportunities for alliances.  In Breakthrough 
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Communities Myron Orfield suggests “two broad-based strategies for change” for ending 
segregation through regionalism, namely organizing “a coalition with a multifaceted 
strength” and secondly litigation (p. 372).  Traditional forms of litigation, however, along 
the lines of Sheff and MacDuffy, will not produce the results we need.   
A.   Sheff and MacDuffy 
In the Sheff case the plaintiffs asked the court for a declaration that Connecticut’s practice 
of basing school districts on municipalities violated the state constitution’s guarantee of 
equal access to public education because it led to the racial isolation of students of color in 
Hartford.  Students of color in Springfield have grounds to bring a similar action.  So why 
not simply replicate the Sheff case and obtain a similar ruling?  The answer to this question 
begins by asking another question: How would we use the ruling?  After all, a declaratory 
judgment is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end.  The outcome of Sheff was a 
statute from the state legislature (Public Act 97-290) directing the state’s education 
department to come up with a five-year plan to remedy inequality within the school 
system, but it did not to address the interconnected issue of residential segregation in and 
around Hartford.  After a return to court and settlement discussions between the parties, 
that process yielded a combination of regional charter and magnet schools in Hartford 
designed to attract students from the suburbs, and boosting the number of school-choice 
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seats in predominantly White suburban schools.  Although the charter and magnet schools 
have attracted suburban students, a disproportionately high number of them have been 
students of color, a development that does not remedy the racial segregation issue 
(Greenleaf, et al, p. 18).  In addition, Massachusetts already has some of the features that 
Connecticut acquired via Sheff such as a racial imbalance statute and school-choice.  So if 
Sheff is not a perfect model, what about MacDuffy v. Secretary of Education? 
The Massachusetts Legislature set about equalizing education funding in response to the 
Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion that the Commonwealth was failing in its duty to provide 
an adequate education for all children, including those who lived in communities that were 
property-poor.  There are two main reasons for not going the MacDuffy route.  First, 
segregation is the main problem, not funding.  While Massachusetts now has a fairer 
distribution formula for distributing funds among largely White suburban schools and 
largely non-White urban schools, MacDuffy and other cases like it nationwide have also 
“implicitly legitimized the segregation of such schools” (Ryan, p. 260).  Quite simply, our 
goal should not be “separate but equal.”  
Secondly, the Supreme Judicial Court has made clear that, given the progress since 
MacDuffy both in terms of accountability and foundation budgets under the Education 
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Reform Act, it is inclined to defer to the legislative and executive branches in fleshing out 
the curricular details of an adequate education (within the parameters the Court laid out in 
MacDuffy) and to the Legislature’s spending priorities of budget concerns.  It is worth 
remembering that the Hancock decision pre-dates the 2008 recession.  If the Court showed 
deference to the Legislature over money before the recession, there is no reason to believe 
it would be less deferential today; far from it.  In view of Hancock and similar decisions 
elsewhere in the US,  one attorney who specializes in educational equity cases has observed 
that plaintiffs would do well to “focus less on funding and more on structural conditions – a 
strategy that might provide a more stable right” (Adams, p. 1634-35).  In Sheff, unlike 
MacDuffy, the litigants tackled the segregation issue head-on but ended up with a set of 
policy changes that have not, in fact, led to educational – still less residential – integration.   
B.  Beyond Sheff and MacDuffy 
If we are to follow the advice of Attorney Adams and focus on the structural issues we need 
to be careful about the structures we are trying to use as well as those we are trying to 
change.  In both Sheff and MacDuffy, the courts issued decisions that had the effect of 
compelling action on the part of legislators.  The legislators then confined themselves to the 
issues of scholastic performance, school funding, and the inter-district movement of 
students, a set of issues that – while not narrow – did not address the underlying problems.  
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So we need to ask ourselves (1) whether we want to focus on the schools alone or also on 
the land-use, transportation, and other issues that intersect with education; and (2) if we 
choose the latter, whether the structure we want to entrust with that designing the raft of 
interconnected remedial policies is the Legislature.  Only the Legislature can turn bills into 
laws, but it matters where those bills originate.  In Sheff, the policy proposals for charter 
and magnet schools emerged from a policy-development process run by the education 
department.  MacDuffy happened in the context of the education-reform debate, which 
focused on student evaluation and funding equity.  In neither Sheff nor MacDuffy did the 
policy developers take a holistic approach, but kept the debate inside the education silo.   
Fashioning the necessary policies to present to the Legislature will require the focused 
thought of a large group of people.  There is no shortage of good ideas as to how we should 
remedy educational achievement disparities, de facto segregation, sprawl, affordable 
housing, food security, neighborhood revitalization, economic regeneration, environmental 
justice, and regional equity.  What we lack – and desperately need – is a body with the remit 
to develop a holistic, cohesive package of interlocking policies specifically for the 
Springfield area, and the authority to push that package forward through the Legislature. 
Just hoping for the right combination of policies to bubble up into state government from 
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think tanks, the academy, and concerned citizens would be naive.  So would an attempt to 
simply graft onto Springfield a set of policies from other communities, even successful 
policies from places that share the city’s key characteristics.  We need to understand how 
segregation in and around Springfield arose before we can undo it.  In other words, history 
matters.  So, because the interconnected issues are so numerous and site-specific, I believe 
that we need a deliberative, broad-based body of academics and lay people to (a) 
investigate the precise historical causes of segregation in and around Springfield and (b) 
devise policies that will reduce segregation and promote racial and socio-economic 
integration across the region.  To ensure that the subsequent proposals merit the serious 
attention of the Legislature, the body should have official status and reside within an 
agency that has a track record of remedying discrimination.  Who could convene such a 
body?   
Certainly the Legislature has the authority, but the legislative process is painfully slow.  If, 
at the start of the next session, we file a bill to establish a commission, it is unlikely to 
become law for several years.  There is another route, however.  As chief magistrate of the 
Commonwealth, the Governor has the power to establish and appoint a special commission 
without asking permission from the Legislature.  If the Governor does, in fact, appoint the 
special commission, its proposals would go to the Governor and from him to the 
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Legislature, either as a package of measures or as a single omnibus bill.  Unlike the rest of 
us, the Governor has the constitutional authority to file a bill at any time and the 
Legislature must give his proposals due consideration.  Nobody can guarantee that the 
Legislature will vote in favor, of course, but by that stage (if our coalition-building and 
mobilization efforts are successful) we will have the capacity to mount a powerful lobbying 
campaign. 
If we ask the Governor to appoint the special commission and he does so forthwith, we 
would not need to take the steps I outline below.  Working on the assumption that he 
declines, I propose that we should file a complaint requesting that the MCAD recommend to 
the Governor that he establish the special commission. 
4.  WHY THE MCAD? 
Litigation and judicially-supervised processes do not necessarily produce outcomes that 
are practically effective (e.g. Sheff).  But litigation that focuses from the outset on 
establishing an independent but accountable body that is designed to produce effective and 
resilient outcomes stands a better chance of success.  Moving the Governor to the point 
where he appoints the special commission involves leverage, and the prerequisite for 
leverage – in addition to a lever of sufficient size – is a place to stand.  For our purposes, the 
ideal place to stand so that we can exert our energies most efficiently is the MCAD.   
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There are three main reasons for choosing the MCAD as the locus for a desegregation case.  
First, since its inception in 1946 the MCAD has played a key role in expanding the reach of 
the anti-discrimination laws.  The law that the MCAD routinely enforces, Chapter 151B, 
contains a provision that most Massachusetts statutes do not, namely a “liberal 
construction” clause.  When the MCAD, or a court reviewing an MCAD decision, has to 
decide whether Chapter 151B applies to a given situation, it has to interpret the statute 
expansively so as to further the public policy goals underlying it.  In practice, this means 
that whereas a narrow, textual reading of Chapter 151B might lead to a conclusion that the 
statute did not apply to a novel fact pattern for which there was no precedent, the liberal-
construction clause pushes in the opposite direction.  So long as the MCAD’s liberal 
interpretation of its authority under the statute is reasonable, a court should not second-
guess its ruling.  Judicial deference to the MCAD’s interpretation of its role – often a 
generous interpretation because of the liberal-construction clause – provides a solid reason 
for bringing our action in the MCAD.  Second, under Chapters 151B and 151C, litigants with 
anti-discrimination claims have to start in the MCAD; this is a threshold matter, meaning 
that they cannot file a complaint in a regular court without having first submitted the case 
to the MCAD.  Third, although it is primarily an adjudicatory body, unlike a court the MCAD 
has no equivalent of a 12 (b)(6) motion, i.e. a motion to dismiss for failure to state a case.  
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This does not mean that every complaint automatically goes to a hearing before a full panel 
of the three-member Commission, but it does mean that the chances of survival are greater 
than in a court. 
A.  History of the MCAD 
The MCAD is the product of generations of activism in Massachusetts.  In 1946, after almost 
a century of lobbying for, testing the limits of, and demanding improvements in the state’s 
anti-discrimination laws, people of color working through civil rights and labor 
organizations persuaded the Governor and Legislature to create the Fair Employment 
Practices Commission, which became the MCAD four years later.  In terms of process, the 
agency was the product of a four-member committee that Governor Tobin established in 
response to a legislative report.  But the agency’s roots lead back much further to the mid-
1880s when African-American attorneys, responding to the Supreme Court’s 1883 
evisceration of the federal Civil Rights Act, brought test cases to demonstrate the need to 
expand the reach of the state’s public-accommodations statute.  In the Legislature, a 
handful of African-American state representatives won over enough of their colleagues to 
assure passage of a series of statutes that gradually expanded the definition of “public 
accommodation” and increased the number of venues where discrimination was explicitly 
prohibited.  The process culminated in the enactment of Chapter 151B, which incorporates 
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the public accommodations law, and in the creation of a specialized agency to handle 
discrimination cases (Vickery).  New York established a similar commission at around the 
same time, and by 1961 there were eighteen other states with analogous agencies some of 
them housed within existing departments of state government (Bamberger & Lewin, p. 
527).  Serving as a model for these commissions was federal Fair Employment Commission, 
which grew out of “a strategic conflict among civil rights groups about how to attack job 
discrimination as well as a troubled but necessary alliance with organized labor” 
(Engstrom, p. 1075).  In the MCAD, the state’s largely unknown civil rights leaders of the 
past have bequeathed us an invaluable, if underused, vehicle. 
B.  MCAD Process and Procedures 
Filing a complaint is the way litigants commence a lawsuit in the MCAD.  There is no filing 
fee, but complainants must file within 300 days of the event, unless the unlawful conduct is 
of “a continuing nature” (804 CMR 1.10(2)). MCAD staff help the individual draft the 
complaint and a supervisor conducts an initial review to confirm that the facts as the 
complainants alleges them could, if true, amount to unlawful discrimination. If the 
reviewers err, they err on the side of generosity to the complainant.  If the complainant 
does not have an attorney, the MCAD may provide counsel.  After the MCAD serves the 
complaint, the respondent has 21 days to file a position statement.  The complainant 
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reviews the position statement and files a rebuttal.  Then an MCAD investigator conducts 
an investigation, which may include an investigative conference, to determine whether 
there are grounds to issue a finding of probable cause.  All cases trigger an investigative 
process unless the MCAD lacks jurisdiction, or the complainant “provides information that 
contradicts an inference of discrimination” or if the complaint “is totally unbelievable on its 
face” (804 CMR 1.13 1(a)).  This is, quite clearly, a low threshold.   
Unlike a preliminary hearing in a court, an investigative conference is an administrative 
proceeding with no fixed rules of procedure or evidence, and does not provide an 
opportunity for a respondent to file a motion to dismiss.  And, importantly, the respondent 
cannot transfer the case to Superior Court during this period.  The regulations define 
probable cause as “sufficient evidence upon which a fact-finder could form a reasonable 
belief that it is more probable than not that the respondent committed an unlawful 
practice.”  Further, “[i]n making this determination, disputes involving genuine issues of 
material fact are to be reserved for determination at hearing.”  Again, this is a low threshold 
for complainants to meet.  At the conclusion of the conference, i.e. even prior to a hearing, 
the responsible Commissioner “may immediately endeavor to eliminate the unlawful 
practice” (804 CMR 1.11 (5)(e)).  In addition, the Commissioner may determine that the 
matter warrants emergency proceedings, thereby suspending the ordinary rules, and order 
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the matter “investigated, heard, and determined... as expeditiously as possible” (804 CMR 
1.12).  Under this rule, the MCAD can hold a public hearing within 21 days of the 
emergency determination and award “traditional equitable relief.”  So whereas many 
MCAD cases take years to resolve, the emergency proceedings enable the Commission to 
put certain matters on a fast track.  Significantly, class actions are now available through 
the MCAD.  I suggest asking the MCAD to certify the complainants (organizational and 
individual) as a class.  Under the MCAD’s regulations (804 CMR 1.09 (4)(a)) we need to 
demonstrate that it would be impractical for all the potential complainants – i.e. all the 
students of color in Springfield – to file suit, and that our complainants adequately 
represent the class as a whole.  Whether the MCAD certifies the case as a class action or not, 
the complaint would ask it to do two things: (1) recommend to the Governor that he 
establish a special commission and (2) seek a court order enjoining the Department of 
Education from disbursing state or federal funds to any and all school districts unless and 
until the Governor does so.  
C.  Why Seek a Preliminary Injunction? 
Asking for an injunction that could have the effect of suspending the operation of schools 
across the whole state may seem overly dramatic, but I believe that the seriousness of the 
constitutional violation warrants it.  The amount of money at stake is enormous.  In 2009, 
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total K-12 education spending was $12.9 billion, with approximately 95% of school budgets 
coming from federal and state funds (Mass Budget & Policy).  In other words, putting a hold 
on federal state funds would leave schools with just 5% of the money they need in order to 
operate.  While this is a significant sanction, it is proportionate in comparison with the kind 
of preliminary injunction plaintiffs would ask for in a voting rights case.  In voting rights 
litigation it is standard operating procedure to ask the court to suspend all elections unless 
and until the state remedies the alleged violation.  It is fair to say that in view of the fact 
that equality of access to public education is no less of a constitutional right than equality of 
the franchise, withholding funds is on a par with suspending elections. 
Essentially, the request for the preliminary injunction communicates a message to the 
Governor, to the court, and to the public at large: The education of Springfield’s students of 
color is no less important than the education of students elsewhere in Massachusetts.  It is 
unfortunate that we have to spell this out, but the fact that in 2012 de facto segregation is 
alive and well in and around Springfield suggests that we must.  Although the MCAD itself 
cannot issue a preliminary injunction against the Education Department, I believe that the 
agency’s record of pushing the anti-discrimination laws ever outward –  “boldly carv[ing] 
new protections out of existing language where it faces claims from a population at risk” 
(Nolan, p. 132) – militates in favor of bringing the case in this particular forum.   
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Seeking a preliminary injunction, therefore, serves two purposes.  It both increases the 
speed of the process and ups the ante.  The injunction would be necessary only if the MCAD 
recommended the establishment of the special commission but the Governor declined to 
act.  So, in the event that the Governor fails to comply with the recommendation, we would 
ask the MCAD to go to Superior Court for an injunction that would prevent the 
disbursement of federal and state funds to all the school districts in the state.  As 
mentioned above, this somewhat draconian step merely reflects the profound nature of the 
harm suffered by Springfield’s students of color.  The scale of the injunction is, I believe, 
commensurate with the scale of the injury.  If the MCAD refuses to take this step, the case 
would proceed under the regulations, hopefully under the accelerated emergency-
proceedings rules set forth in 804 CMR 13.  If the Complainants were to apply for injunctive 
relief themselves, rather than having the MCAD do so, my reading of Section 9 suggests that 
jurisdiction would vest exclusively in the Superior Court.  For the reasons I describe above, 
I believe that we should stay within the Commission. 
5.  CHOICE OF RESPONDENTS 
No single community or school district is responsible for the decision to enforce Chapter 
76, Section 5, at the expense of the Racial Imbalance Law.  As subdivisions of the 
Commonwealth they share, but are not individually capable of acting on, the duty to uphold 
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the Article 1 rights of Springfield’s students of color.  That said, all municipalities that 
receive federal community-development block grants have a duty to affirmatively further 
fair housing, and there is a precedent for using litigation to hold them accountable, namely 
the action the Anti-Discrimination Center of New York successfully brought an against 
Westchester County under the federal False Claims Act (Westchester Case).  Conceivably, 
then, we could commence similar actions against the eight majority-White communities 
that abut Springfield.  But unlike a county or similar unit of regional government, those 
communities would lack the coordinative cohesion necessary to either develop a raft of 
remedial regional policies or set up a well resourced special commission to fashion them.   
As sovereign, the Commonwealth is the entity that bears legal responsibility for upholding 
the constitutional rights of its residents.  And as chief magistrate of the Commonwealth, it is 
the Governor who has the power to establish and appoint the special commission.  
Accordingly, I suggest naming the Commonwealth, rather than a combination of 
municipalities, as the Respondent.  In addition, although it is an executive agency 
subordinate to the Governor, I suggest naming the Department of Education as the second 
Respondent.  This arises out of my opinion that it makes sense to seek a preliminary 
injunction as insurance against the possibility that the Governor might choose to ignore the 
MCAD’s recommendation.       
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6.  CHOICE OF COMPLAINANTS 
In addition to being inherently unequal, it is well established that segregation in education 
is harmful (Bireda; Chang; Hanushek).  Because segregation contradicts the unequivocal 
public policy of the Commonwealth, I do not believe that it is necessary for our 
complainants to prove that segregated schools have caused them, or threaten to cause 
them, individual harm.  The main difficulty we will encounter, I believe, comes in the form 
of a curious gap in the framework of anti-discrimination and civil rights laws.  Chapter 
151B expressly prohibits discrimination in employment and housing, while Chapter 272 
relates to public accommodations.  Chapter 151C covers schools, but not completely. 
Chapter 151C applies to people “seeking admission” to schools.  Despite the rule of liberal 
construction, in the past the MCAD has declined to exercise jurisdiction over cases where a 
person was claiming discrimination after having been admitted to an educational 
institution.  Accordingly, I believe that at least one (ideally several) of our complainants 
should be students who have tried to avail themselves of the Racial Imbalance Act 
procedure for transferring.  We should choose some complainants who have applied for 
school-choice transfers unsuccessfully, others who are not yet at that stage, and also ensure 
that our complainants reflect the organizations in our coalition, a process some refer to as 
“stacking the plaintiffs” and ticket balancing” (Stone 348).  At this stage, I believe that the 
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MCAD might certify ours as a class action pursuant to its regulations and that UMN would 
meet the requirements to serve as a representative party for the class.  However, further 
investigation of UMN and the other potential coalition members will be necessary in order 
to make decisions about standing.   
7.  COALITION MEMBERS 
Denial of equal protection is a constitutional issue, so it is tempting to perceive the 
situation solely as a question of rights and to pursue a rights-based solution.  Certainly, this 
approach is an important part of the proposal partly because in Massachusetts we have a 
unique enforcement mechanism (Stone, p. 332) in the form of the MCAD.  There is also a 
large body of legal scholarship on the role of schools as the “frontier of civil rights law” and 
“the main avenues to equality” (McCaughey, p. 273), scholarship we can draw on to build 
our case and mobilize like-minded lawyers, practitioners and academics.  But we can also 
look at the situation through the lenses of regional equity and sustainability, lenses that 
allow us to see and present the dispute more expansively and attract stakeholders that we 
might not, in the first instance, categorize as potential allies.  As Deeohn Ferris explains in 
Breakthrough Communities: 
 “For African Americans, the central regional equity challenge is to create sustainable 
 metropolitan communities through sound decisions that respect the linkages 
 between community health and prosperity and economics, civil rights, 
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 environmental factors, transportation, land use, and development” (p. 329). 
Land use issues, such as sprawl and fragmentation, are central to understanding the way 
segregation becomes self-reinforcing (Orfield, p. 878-89).  Some of the challenges that 
Springfield faces, challenges that are entwined with the issue of segregation, provide 
opportunities for a broad coalition of community-based organizations.  This is because the 
solutions to segregation will also serve as solutions to other problems. For example, 
Springfield is one of the poorest communities in Massachusetts.  Compared with 
Massachusetts as a whole, the Springfield school district has three times as many families 
living below the poverty level.  Although it is the source of most of the jobs in the Pioneer 
Valley, it also has the region’s highest unemployment rate (Greenleaf, et al).  When it 
examines the causes of segregation and studies possible remedies, the special commission 
will, perforce, have to engage with the problem of prolonged, trans-generational poverty 
and systemic unemployment.  In addition to poverty and unemployment, another issue 
phenomenon bedeviling Springfield is crime.  In 2008, Springfield had the state’s second 
highest crime count (1,901) and the third highest violent crime rate (1,261.9 per 10,000 
persons) (Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, Research & Policy 
Analysis Division, 2009).  Citizen groups whose agendas focus on liberating their 
communities from crime will have, in the special commission, an opportunity to influence 
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the policy-making process.  Potential core members of the coalition include the Union of 
Minority Neighborhoods (UMN), the Springfield NAACP, and the Urban League.  Because 
combating educational segregation is at the heart of its mission, I suggest UMN as the 
convener.  In that capacity UMN would meet with representatives of the NAACP and Urban 
League and draw up a list of invitees for an initial exploratory meeting. Building out from 
the core, the coalition could come to include labor, environmental, and faith-based 
organizations that recognize the necessity of addressing the challenges that bedevil 
Springfield on a regional basis. Similarly situated communities have taken a regional 
approach, such as the New Jersey Regional Coalition, which hosted the People’s Summit on 
Regional Equity in 2003.  Similarly in Cleveland, Ohio, the African American Forum on Race 
and Regionalism noted that “[h]istorically devastating exclusionary and discriminatory 
policies, combined with current regional dynamics of urban disinvestment and inefficient, 
fragmented suburban growth have created vast disparities for many of Cleveland’s 
residents” (Blackwell et al, p. 2).  Among the report’s recommendations were a regional 
community development corporation plus a regional housing and development plan (p. 
295).  Pushed in that direction by the coalition, the special commission could develop 
policies for regional education and development plans. 
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8.  INSIDE-OUTSIDE STRATEGY 
It is helpful to think of the coalition’s tasks as two-fold.  One part involves building the case 
for the MCAD (identifying potential complainants, etc.).  This is the “inside” element of the 
strategy in that it focuses on what goes on inside the MCAD as an institution.  The “outside” 
element entails trying to obtain the special commission by applying pressure to other 
levers situated at other junctures of state and local government.  After the Governor 
appoints the special commission the inside and outside elements both continue. The 
project will move into another phase, which will involve at least as much activity as the 
litigation phase, probably much more.  The inside aspect will focus on the special 
commission as an institution.  For example, coalition members should press the special 
commission to consider how best to achieve economic integration; they may choose to 
offer suggestions about land use measures such as inclusionary zoning and regional 
planning.  As before, the outside element will consist of engaging in dialog with allied 
stakeholders, ensuring that they continue to own the project, and securing new 
commitments.   
9.  CONCLUSION  
Just as segregation arose from the inter-relationship between housing and other policies 
(some intentionally discriminatory, others not) integration will depend upon, and affect, 
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developments in other policy areas.  Because “spatial arrangement remains one of the most 
fundamental ways that opportunities are distributed in the United States” integrating 
education depends upon integrating the communities in our region (Ferris in Breakthrough 
Communities, p. 331).  Accordingly, this endeavor creates an opportunity for several 
organizations to work together on a project that promises a variety of co-benefits.  Building 
the MCAD case promises to draw together low-income communities of color, 
environmental and sustainability advocates, small businesses, and labor, in a coalition to 
demand changes in the social, economic, and built infrastructure of the region.  Creating an 
official deliberative body that has the necessary political heft but is not controlled by local 
powerbrokers is a step along the way to enacting policies that will generate benefits across 
many fronts.  Ensuring that this deliberative body produces proposals that are practical 
and effective will require significant, sustained involvement on the part of several 
community-based organizations and their allies. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 
MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 
 
Hampden, ss.       Docket No. ___ - __________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
 
        
         
        
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Commonwealth’s practice of assigning students to schools based on their place of 
residence has the effect of denying and abridging the Complainants’ right to equality under 
the law.  The Complainants request that the Commission recommend that the Governor 
establish a special commission to draft proposals for ensuring the integration of the public 
schools in and around Springfield. 
 
2.  PARTIES 
1.  Complainant, the Union of Minority Neighborhoods (“UMN”), is a nonprofit corporation 
with tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, organized 
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with a principal place of business 
at 42 Seaverns Avenue, Jamaica Plain, Boston, Massachusetts. 
UNION OF MINORITY 
NEIGHBORHOODS, 
[Named Individual 1], and 
[Named Individual 2], 
Complainants, 
 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, and 
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF 
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY 
EDUCATION, 
Respondents. 
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2.  Complainant, [Named Individual 1], by and through [parent/guardian] is a minor 
residing in Springfield, Massachusetts. 
3.  Complainant, [Named Individual 2], by and through [parent/guardian] is a minor 
residing in Springfield, Massachusetts. 
4.  Respondent, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, is a sovereign state within the United 
States of America. 
5.  Respondent, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, is 
an agency of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, within the Executive Office of 
Education, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 69, §1A,  having a principal office in Boston, Massachusetts. 
 
3.  JURISDICTION 
6.  The Commission has jurisdiction pursuant to M.G.L. c. 151B and 151C. 
 
4.  FACTS 
7.  [Named Individual 1] resides in ____ within Springfield.  Pursuant to M.G. L. c. 76, §5, the 
Springfield School Committee assigned her to attend Central High School. 
8.  In 2011-12, only 18% of the students at Central High School were White, while 25.1% 
were African-American, and 46.1% were Hispanic.  The school was in a condition of “racial 
imbalance,” as M.G.L. c. 71, §37D (the Racial Imbalance Act) defines the term. 
9.  On or about _____ 2012, [Named Individual 1] through her [parent/guardian] sought a 
transfer to ___ School in East Longmeadow.  The school rejected her application on the basis 
that there were insufficient seats. 
10.  [Named Individual 2] resides in ____ within Springfield.  Pursuant to M.G. L. c. 76, §5, the 
Springfield School Committee assigned her to attend __________. 
11.  On or about [Named Individual 2] through her [parent/guardian] sought a transfer to 
___ School in __________.  The school rejected her application on the basis that there were 
insufficient seats. 
12.  The following public schools in Springfield are in a condition of racial imbalance as 
defined by M.G.L. c. 71, §37D, the Racial Imbalance Act: [list] 
13.  The Commonwealth by and through its subdivisions enforces M.G.L. c. 76, §5, and 
thereby assigns students to public schools on the basis of their place of residence. 
14. Springfield and the abutting communities are in a condition of de facto residential racial 
segregation.  Consequently, by causing and permitting Springfield students to be assigned 
to public schools in Springfield the Commonwealth effectively assigns them to racially 
segregated schools. 
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15.  The claims of the Complainants are typical of the claims of all students of color in the 
Springfield public schools, the class of potential complainants is so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable, and there are questions of law and fact common to the 
class. 
16.  Complainant the Union of Minority Neighborhoods has as one of its purposes the 
elimination of discrimination and segregation in education.  It is acting to vindicate an 
important public interest and to deter future violations.  It is a representative party that 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Springfield’s students of color. 
17.  Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Part 2, c. 2, §1, Art, 1, 
the Governor has the authority to establish a special commission to study the historic 
causes of residential segregation in and around Springfield and (b) devise policies to (i) 
prevent further racial segregation and (ii) promote racial and economic integration  in and 
around Springfield. 
 
5.  COUNTS 
COUNT I: Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Article 1 
18.  The Complainants repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 
17 herein as if more fully set forth below. 
19.  Article I of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides that “[e]quality under the 
law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.” 
20.  By promoting and preserving segregated schools the Commonwealth significantly 
encourages and involves itself in racial discrimination, which constitutes a denial of 
equality under the law contrary to Article I. 
21.  Unless the Commission obtains an order enjoining the Board of Education, the 
Complainants will suffer loss of money and irreparable harm. 
22.  The Complainants have no adequate remedy at law. 
 
COUNT II: Massachusetts Constitution, Article of Amendment 111 
23.  The Complainants repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 
17 herein as if more fully set forth below. 
24.  Article of Amendment 111 to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
provides that “no student shall be assigned to or denied admittance to a public school on 
the basis of race, color, national origin or creed.” 
25.  By promoting and preserving segregated schools the Commonwealth assigns the 
Complainants to, and denies them admittance to, public schools on the basis of race in 
violation of Article of Amendment 111. 
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26.  As a result of the Respondents’ acts and omissions the Complainants have suffered 
harm. 
27.  Unless the Commission obtains an order enjoining the Board of Education, the 
Complainants will suffer loss of money and irreparable harm. 
28.  The Complainants have no adequate remedy at law. 
 
COUNT III: M.G.L. c. 151B 
29.  The Complainants repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 
17 herein as if more fully set forth below. 
30.  The acts and omissions of the Respondents constitute unlawful practices within the 
meaning of M.G.L. c. 151B. 
31.  As a result of the Respondents’ acts and omissions the Complainants have suffered 
harm. 
32.  Unless the Commission obtains an order enjoining the Board of Education, the 
Complainants will suffer loss of money and irreparable harm. 
33.  The Complainants have no adequate remedy at law. 
 
COUNT IV: M.G.L. c. 151C 
34.  The Complainants repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 
17 herein as if more fully set forth below. 
35.  The acts and omissions of the Respondents constitute unfair practices within the 
meaning of M.G.L. c. 151C. 
36.  As a result of the Respondents’ acts and omissions the Complainants have suffered 
harm. 
37.  Unless the Commission obtains an order enjoining the Board of Education, the 
Complainants will suffer loss of money and irreparable harm. 
38.  The Complainants have no adequate remedy at law. 
 
COUNT V:  M.G.L. c. 71, §§ 37C 
39.  The Complainants repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 
17 herein as if more fully set forth below. 
40.  The acts and omissions of the Respondents are contrary to policy of the commonwealth 
of encouraging all school committees to adopt as educational objectives the promotion of 
racial balance and the correction of existing racial imbalance in the public schools. 
41.  As a result of the Respondents’ acts and omissions the Complainants have suffered 
harm. 
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42.  Unless the Commission obtains an order enjoining the Board of Education, the 
Complainants will suffer loss of money and irreparable harm. 
43.  The Complainants have no adequate remedy at law. 
 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE the Complainants respectfully request that the Commission: 
1. Recommend to the Governor that he appoint and fund a commission to (a) study the 
 historic causes of residential segregation in and around Springfield and (b) devise 
policies  to (i) prevent further racial segregation and (ii) promote racial and economic 
integration  in and around Springfield; 
2. File a petition in equity seeking an order from the Superior Court directing the 
Board of  Education to withhold state and federal funding from any and all school 
committees in  Massachusetts pending the Governor’s establishment of such a 
commission;  
3. Award Complainants their costs and attorneys’ fees; and 
4. Order such further relief as the Commission deems just and appropriate. 
      Respectfully Submitted 
      The Complainants 
      By Their Attorney: 
 
 
 
      ____________________ 
      Peter Vickery, Esq. 
      BBO # 641574 
      P.O. Box 300 
      Amherst, MA 01004-0300 
      Tel. (413) 549 9933 
      Fax (413) 256 1207 
 
      Date: 
 
VERIFICATION 
I __________ have read the foregoing Verified Complaint and know the contents thereof and 
the same are true of my own knowledge except as to such matters therein stated to be on 
information and belief, and as to these matters, I believe them to be true. 
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 Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that 
the foregoing is true and correct. 
 Executed on this _____  day of ____________ , 2012. 
 
       By:________________________ 
 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 I, Peter Vickery, Esq., attorney for the Plaintiffs, hereby certify that I served a copy of 
the foregoing document by fax, e-mail, and first-class mail this day upon Attorney General 
Martha Coakley, One Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108 and Paul Reville, Secretary of 
Education, One Ashburton Place, Room 1403, Boston, MA 02108. 
 
      ____________________ 
      Peter Vickery, Esq. 
      Date: 
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 
MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 
 
Hampden, ss.       Docket No. ___ - __________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Complainants challenge the Commonwealth’s retention and support of racially 
homogeneous schools, a practice that perpetuates patterns of educational and residential 
segregation in violation of Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights as well as the state’s civil 
rights laws and its anti-discrimination legislation.  While fair on its face, the state’s law 
conditioning place of schooling on place of residence has a disparate impact on students 
color.  What the Complainants seek is the creation of a special commission that will devise 
policies to remedy the ongoing constitutional violation.   
 
II.  PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD 
The Complainants are asking the Commission to recommend that the Governor establish a 
panel or commission to develop a plan for desegregating the public schools in and around 
Springfield.  Because the ongoing violation of their constitutional rights constitutes an 
irreparable harm, they are also asking the Commissioner to seek injunctive relief, namely 
an order from the Superior Court enjoining the Board of Education from disbursing state 
UNION OF MINORITY 
NEIGHBORHOODS, 
[Named Individual], and 
[Named Individual], 
Complainants, 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, and 
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION, 
Respondents. 
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and federal funds to any and all school committees unless and until the Governor 
establishes such a body.  Under the statute that governs the procedures of the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) the Commissioner has the 
authority to seek injunctive relief. 
 
Because the parties to the petition would be public officers, the traditional three-part test 
for injunctive relief would not apply.  The Supreme Judicial Court has held that it is not 
necessary to demonstrate irreparable harm “[w]hen the government acts to enforce a 
statute or make effective a declared policy of the Legislature, the standard of public interest 
and not the requirements of private litigation measure the propriety and need for 
injunctive relief.” Commonwealth v. Mass CRINC, 392 Mass. 79, 88 (1984) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted).  What the trial court must determine is whether the injunction 
would promote or harm the public interest. 
 
The standard would be the same if the Complainants, rather than the Commissioner, were 
directly petitioning the Superior Court because where “a suit is brought by a citizen acting 
as a private attorney general to enforce a statute or a declared policy of the Legislature, 
irreparable harm is not required” for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. LeClair v. 
Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 331-332, 719 N.E.2d 464 (1999). 
 
III.  LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS 
Declaration of Rights Claims 
Article 1 
Article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides that “[e]quality under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.”  The 
Supreme Judicial Court considered this provision in the context of efforts to desegregate 
the public schools in Boston and Springfield during the early 1970s.  As a result of those 
decisions, there is no doubt that in Massachusetts it unconstitutional to use “[s]tate power 
to promote and entrench racial separation in all those schools whose communities have 
segregated residential patterns” Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass. 899, 906 (1973).  By 
continuing to operate an education system that both reflects and perpetuates residential 
segregation, the Commonwealth is violating Article 1. 
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The state has a policy, embodied in M.G.L. c. 76, §5, of basing school assignment on 
residence.1  Because Springfield and the surrounding communities are residentially 
segregated according to race, this policy has the effect of assigning students of color in 
Springfield to segregated schools. This amounts to the kind of disparate impact over which 
the MCAD has jurisdiction and discriminatory motive is not an essential element. Smith 
College v. MCAD, 376 Mass. 221 (1978).      
 
In the United States as a whole, “residential segregation that exists in metropolitan areas 
does not typically occur within the same towns, but rather occurs between municipalities.”2  
The pattern of residential segregation between Springfield and the surrounding 
communities is consistent with this trend.  Springfield is a racially segregated city within a 
racially segregated region.  The city is 51.8% White and 22.3% African-American, with 
38.8% of the total population identify as Hispanic/Latino.  In 2000, the US Census Bureau’s 
Housing and Household Economics Statistics Division ascribed Springfield a Gini index 
value of 0.816 for African-American residents and 0.813 for Hispanic residents, with 1.0 
indicating maximum segregation. In contrast to Springfield, the eight communities that 
abut Springfield are overwhelmingly White with only two of them having populations that 
are less than 90% White (see Attachment 1).  For example, East Longmeadow is 94.5% 
White with African Americans making up 1.4% of the town’s population, and only 2.3% 
identifying as Hispanic/Latino. 
 
As a result of residential segregation, the public schools in and around Springfield are also 
segregated.  In the Springfield school district, 13.7% of the students are White, 20.7% are 
African-American, and 59.8% are Hispanic.  In East Longmeadow, by way of contrast, 
89.9% of the students are White, 3.1% are African-American, and 3.1% are Hispanic.  
                                               
1 The statute provides: “Every person shall have a right to attend the public schools of the town where he 
actually resides, subject to the following section. No school committee is required to enroll a person who does 
not actually reside in the town unless said enrollment is authorized by law or by the school committee. Any 
person who violates or assists in the violation of this provision may be required to remit full restitution to the 
town of the improperly-attended public schools. No person shall be excluded from or discriminated against in 
admission to a public school of any town, or in obtaining the advantages, privileges and courses of study of 
such public school on account of race, color, sex, religion, national origin or sexual orientation.” 
2 James E. Ryan, “Schools, Race, and Money,” 109 Yale L.J. 249, 277 (1999). 
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Similarly, in Longmeadow, 86.3% of the students are White, 2.8% are African-American, 
and 2.7% are Hispanic. 3   
 
Within Springfield, the number of White students at some schools is very low.  In 
Springfield Central High School, for example, only 18% of the students are White, while 
25.1% are African-American, and 46.1% are Hispanic.4  The Legislature has defined this 
condition, i.e. “a public school in which more than fifty percent of the pupils attending such 
school are non-white,” as “racial imbalance” (M.G.L. c. 71, §37D, the Racial Imbalance Act).  
The purpose of the statute is clear:  
 “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the commonwealth to encourage all school 
 committees to adopt as educational objectives the promotion of racial balance and 
 the correction of existing racial imbalance in the public schools. The prevention or 
 elimination of racial imbalance shall be an objective in all decisions involving the 
 drawing or altering of school attendance lines, establishing of grade levels, and the 
 selection of new school sites.” M.G.L. c. 71, §§ 37C. 
 
The statute gives non-white students in a racially imbalanced school the right “to be 
transferred to and to attend any other school... under the jurisdiction of the same school 
committee or regional district school committee if racial isolation [meaning at least 70% of 
the students are White] exists in such other school.”  If there are no places available, the 
onus shifts to the school committee to come up with a plan.  If the total number of students 
“exercising their right to be transferred” exceeds the number of places available at the 
predominantly White schools in the district, the school committee must come up with 
another plan.   
 
Conceivably such a plan could entail redrawing the district lines, but this would require the 
“voluntary cooperation” of neighboring communities.  The board of education may redraw 
district lines over the heads of the local school committees, but the new districts must “bear 
a clear geographical relationship to each other and [be] truly districts in that they divide 
the entire school system into a sufficient number of sectors” School Committee of Boston v. 
Board of Education, 364 Mass. 199, 207 (1973). 
                                               
3 Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, School/District Profiles, 2011-12 
Enrollment Data. 
4 Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, School/District Profiles. 
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The other relevant statute (M.G.L. c. 76, §12B) sets a statewide limit on the number of 
students participating in the school choice program, capping it at two percent of the total 
number of public-school students (although students participating in school choice under 
the Racial Imbalance Act do not count toward this two percent cap).  Further, it is local 
school committees that designate the number of school-choice seats available in their 
districts; they may even choose to accept no school-choice students at all.   
 
Clearly, the school choice program is not an adequate remedy to the ongoing violation of 
Article 1. Certainly, under the Racial Imbalance Act and the school choice program a 
student living in the Central High catchment area could try to enroll instead in a school 
situated in another district, but there is no guarantee that she will succeed.  This situation 
perpetuates segregation in a way that the Supreme Judicial Court held (almost 40 years 
ago) to violate Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights.  In 1973, the Legislature enacted 
House Bill 6657, which would have required prior written consent from a parent or 
guardian for their child to attend a school other the one “nearest his residence within his 
city or town.”  The bill was an attempt to fend off attempts to desegregate the public 
schools via busing.  In response to the Governor’s request, the Supreme Judicial Court 
rendered an advisory opinion.  Finding that House Bill 6657 violated the federal guarantee 
of equal protection and Articles 1 and 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held: 
 “[E]ven in situations where there is only de facto segregation, if the State adopts a 
 policy  which freezes these de facto conditions by imposing severe limitations on 
 local school officials’ discretionary authority to take effective remedial action, then 
 the State policy constitutes State action serving to continue segregation in the 
 schools and thus significantly encourages and involves the state in private racial 
 discrimination.” Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass. 899, 902-3 (1973). 
 
The following year, the Supreme Judicial Court reiterated that policies that have the effect 
of freezing segregation in place are tantamount to “authorization to discriminate” and are, 
therefore, unconstitutional.  The Court was considering the efforts of Springfield’s school 
committee to undo the city’s previous desegregation efforts.  The school committee was 
relying on a newly enacted emergency statute, Chapter 636, through which the Legislature 
had arguably empowered school committees to forestall racial-balance plans.  The Court 
held: 
 “[A]ny action taken either by the Legislature or by the school committee of 
 Springfield which would tend to reverse or impede the progress toward the 
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 achievement of racial balance in Springfield’s schools would constitute a violation of 
 the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of arts. 1 and 10 of 
 the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.”  School Committee for 
 Springfield v. Board of Education, 366 Mass. 315, 327 (1974). 
 
If the school committee rescinded the task force’s plan, the decision would prevent the 
board of education from eliminating racial imbalance in Springfield.  For that reason, the 
decision would “constitute State action serving to continue segregation in the schools and 
thus significantly involve the State in racial discrimination” School Committee for 
Springfield v. Board of Education, 366 Mass. 315, 334 (1974) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  The Springfield decision stands for the principle that state action that 
positively perpetuates segregation violates Article 1.  That is the very principle at issue 
here. 
 
As the Supreme Court of the United States has observed: “People gravitate toward school 
facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of people. The location of 
schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area 
and have important impact on composition of inner-city neighborhood,” Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971).  
 
The Commonwealth’s practice of confining students of color to schools in their racially 
segregated neighborhoods – unless those students successfully opt en masse into the school 
choice program – entrenches both educational and residential segregation.  Accordingly, it 
violates Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights.  The fact that Springfield Central High School 
remains racially imbalanced demonstrates that the Racial Imbalance Act and the school 
choice program are inadequate responses to that ongoing violation. 
 
Article of Amendment 111 
Article of Amendment 111 to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
provides that “no student shall be assigned to or denied admittance to a public school on 
the basis of race, color, national origin or creed.”  In practice, however, race is the basis on 
which the Commonwealth assigns students of color to school.  
 
The connection between place of residence and place of schooling embodied in the school-
attendance statute, M.G.L. c. 76, §5, not only ensures that the racial composition of schools 
reflects that of the communities they are situated in; it also reinforces and perpetuates that 
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racial composition.  By promoting and preserving segregated schools the Commonwealth 
assigns the Complainants to some public schools – and denies them admittance to others – 
on the basis of race. This practice violates Article of Amendment 111.  It also violates the 
Educational Fair Practices Act, one of the two statutes that give the Commission 
jurisdiction over this case. 
 
M.G.L. c. 151C (Educational Fair Practices Act) 
The current residence-based education system contradicts the Educational Fair Practices 
Act, Section 2 of which provides: “It shall be an unfair educational practice for an 
educational institution: (a) To exclude or limit or otherwise discriminate against any 
United States citizen or citizens seeking admission as students to such institution because 
of race, religion, creed, color or national origin.”  But excluding, limiting, and otherwise 
discriminating against Springfield’s students of color is what the Commonwealth does on a 
day to day basis by enforcing Chapter 76, §5.  Because the Commonwealth enforces Chapter 
76, §5, students of color who live in racially segregated neighborhoods within Springfield 
are excluded from the schools in the predominantly White communities that surround 
Springfield. 
 
Complainants are not arguing that any one particular school district is engaged in 
deliberate discrimination, but rather that by applying Chapter 76, Section 5 all districts in 
Massachusetts are discriminating against students of color.  In other words, the system 
within which all public schools operate is inherently discriminatory.  It is the across-the-
board exclusion of Springfield’s students of color from admission to the schools in the 
region that are not racially imbalanced, and the practice of limiting them to schools that are 
racially imbalanced that is discriminatory.  Reading Chapter 151C in a manner consistent 
with the Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights, Chapter 151B, and the Racial Imbalance Act 
leads to a finding that the comprehensive pattern of exclusion constitutes an unfair 
educational practice. 
 
M.G.L. c. 151B (Anti-Discrimination Act) 
Under Chapter 151B, §5, the Commission has the authority to enforce the public 
accommodations law, M.G.L. c. 272, § 98.  This is the statute that served as the model for the 
first federal civil rights act, and it provides in pertinent part: 
 “All persons shall have the right to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, 
 facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement 
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 subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to 
 all persons. This right is recognized and declared to be a civil right.”  
 
Section 92A defines the term “place of public accommodation” but does not expressly 
include or exclude schools.  Rather it states that the term “shall be deemed to include any 
place, whether licensed or unlicensed, which is open to and accepts or solicits the 
patronage of the general public” and after the phrase “without limiting the generality of 
this definition” goes on to list ten categories of places. 
 
After reviewing similar anti-discrimination statutes from other jurisdictions the Supreme 
Judicial Court agreed with the refusal to place “undue emphasis on either the principle of 
ejusdem generis or the rule that penal statutes must be interpreted strictly” Local Finance 
Company of Rockland v. MCAD, 355 Mass. 10, 14 (1968).  Nevertheless, in the past the 
Commission has held that because of the narrow scope of Chapter 151C, which covers 
discrimination during the application process, it lacks jurisdiction over discrimination 
directed toward students already enrolled in public schools. Beagan v. Town of Falmouth, 9 
MDLR 1209 (1987) and Barrett v. City of Worcester School Department, 23 MDLR 22 (2001).  
Complainants respectfully request that the Commission revisit and reverse this decision 
and deem public schools to fall within the meaning of the term “place of public 
accommodation.” 
 
IV.  PUBLIC POLICY 
The purpose behind Chapter 151B is to eradicate discrimination, the same purpose 
embodied in Article 1, Chapter 151C, and the Racial Imbalance Act.  By encouraging the 
Governor to establish the special commission, the preliminary injunction would further this 
public policy. 
 
By recommending the establishment of a panel to draft remedial policies, the Commission 
will, in effect, be helping to uphold the Racial Imbalance Act.  The statute contains a schema 
for encouraging school districts to meet their obligations, which entails the Board of 
Education withholding funds from districts that are not in compliance.  Dicta from the 
Supreme Judicial Court suggest that it is quite permissible for the Commission to take steps 
that are outside the terms of the Racial Imbalance Act but have the effect of enforcing its 
provisions.  With regard to the withholding of funds under Sections 1I-1J, the Court has 
held that there is “no reason to conclude that this mechanism was intended to be the 
exclusive means of encouraging the achievement of racial balance in the public schools, and 
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implementing the basic policy expressed in G. L. c. 71, § 37C.”  School Committee of Boston v. 
Board of Education, 363 Mass. 20, 24-5 (1973). 
 
V.  BALANCE OF HARMS 
Although the Complainants are asking the MCAD to seek an order from the Superior Court 
enjoining the Board of Education from disbursing funds pending the creation of such a 
panel, this is not a school-funding case in the tradition of McDuffy v. Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Education, 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993) and Hancock v. 
Commissioner of Education, 443 Mass. 428 (2005).  The Complainants are not requesting 
the MCAD or the court to set up and oversee a new financing structure for the public 
schools.  To the contrary, all they ask is that the Governor convene a panel of experts with 
the skills and resources to devise a raft of policies to remedy the unconscionable 
segregation that currently denies Springfield’s students their equal rights. 
 
The Governor can establish a special commission by way of an executive order.  He has the 
constitutional authority and needs no legislative approval.  If the Governor declines to act 
on the recommendation of the MCAD, the preliminary injunction would forbid the 
disbursement of federal and state funds to all the schools in Massachusetts.  Accordingly, if 
the injunction issues, there is a risk schools across Massachusetts could suffer some harm.  
Delaying the disbursement of federal and state funds to local school committees could 
create uncertainty and possibly cause some school committees to suspend operations.  It is 
possible that the education of all students across the Commonwealth would suffer to 
varying degrees.  Those injuries, however, would likely be of a temporary and remediable 
nature.  In contrast, the injuries that the Complainants and other students of color in 
Springfield’s public schools sustain through the ongoing violation of their constitutional 
rights are enduring and ineradicable. 
 
At issue is the right of Springfield’s students of color to the equal protection of the laws. In 
essence the question is: Does the Commonwealth’s interest in having schools elsewhere in 
Massachusetts run smoothly without risk of interruption outweigh the right of the 
Complainants to equality under the law consistent with the promise of Article 1?  The 
Complainants respectfully suggest that it does not. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Complainants can show a likelihood of success o n the merits and that public policy , ie. 
favoring equality and disfavoring racial segregation, weighs in their favor.  If the injunction 
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issues, the Governor will have a choice.  He can either establish a special commission or 
allow the schools in the Commonwealth to wait for federal and state funds.  Given the 
serious nature of the constitutional violation to which the Commonwealth is subjecting the 
Complainants and students of color in Springfield, the threat of such a delay would be 
proportionate to the scale of the injury. 
 
      Respectfully Submitted 
      The Complainants 
      By Their Attorney: 
 
 
 
      ____________________ 
      Peter Vickery, Esq. 
      BBO # 641574 
      P.O. Box 300 
      Amherst, MA 01004-0300 
      Tel. (413) 549 9933 
      Fax (413) 256 1207 
 
      Date: 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Peter Vickery, Esq., attorney for the Plaintiffs, hereby certify that I served a copy of the 
foregoing document by fax, e-mail, and first-class mail this day upon Attorney General 
Martha Coakley, One Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108 and Paul Reville, Secretary of 
Education, One Ashburton Place, Room 1403, Boston, MA 02108. 
 
      ____________________ 
      Peter Vickery, Esq. 
      Date: 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
Community % White % African American % Hispanic/Latino 
Springfield 51.8 22.3 38.8 
Agawam 94.5 1.5 3.3 
Chicopee 86.8 3.7 14.8 
East Longmeadow 94.5 1.4 2.3 
Hampden 96.6 0.5 1.4 
Longmeadow 92.4 1.0 2.3 
Ludlow 93.9 2.4 5.6 
West Springfield 86.3 3.3 8.7 
Wilbraham 94.0 2.1 2.7 
    Source: U.S. Census 2010 
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Executive Summary 
The problem of education segregation in Springfield amounts to a denial of constitutional rights 
and government failure, and the responsibility for remedying the problem rests with the 
Commonwealth as a whole.  Springfield’s low-performing schools and low graduation rates have 
a disparate impact on students of color, which is one of several manifestations of the city’s racial 
divide.  In recent years, Springfield has remedied one of its long-standing symptoms of racial 
inequality, namely its form of city government.  The way that remedy emerged provides us with 
an instructive example. 
We consider three alternatives: (1) an inter-district magnet school; (2) an investigation by the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and (3) expanding the Springfield 
METCO program.  Measuring our proposals in terms of effectiveness, equity, efficiency, and 
political feasibility, we conclude that the MCAD proposal ranks highest.  Accordingly, we 
recommend calling on the MCAD to (a) investigate the historic causes of residential and 
educational segregation in Springfield, and (b) formulate a raft of policy proposals that would 
remedy the two interconnected problems. 
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Problem 
Children in Massachusetts have a constitutional right to an education, and the Commonwealth 
has the duty to provide all children, regardless of race and ethnicity, with an education in seven 
basic areas (MacDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education, 1993).  For many years, 
however, the Commonwealth has failed to provide Latinos and African-Americans in Springfield 
– who make up more than 80% of the school district’s students – with that basic right.   
Most students in Springfield are from low-income families, live in neighborhoods that are (in 
effect) racially segregated, and go to their local schools.  It comes as no surprise, therefore, that 
Springfield’s schools look like the neighborhoods they serve.  If a neighborhood is 
overwhelmingly poor and non-white, the students will be overwhelming poor and non-white as 
well.  There has long been agreement that students in high-poverty schools are more likely to 
drop out and Springfield’s experience supports this conclusion (Green).   
Although per-pupil spending and teacher’s salaries in Springfield are relatively high, the 
graduation rate is only 53%, compared to a statewide rate of 82% (see Figures 1, 2, and 3).  
These low graduation rates and high drop-out rates are strong signals that Springfield’s public 
schools are failing to teach students of color effectively.  The negative effects of a sub-par 
education do not end when the students leave school.  Dropping out has long-term consequences, 
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as does not attending college.  Earnings for drop-outs have declined in real terms over the past 
three decades and the gap between college graduates and non-graduates has expanded (Murnane, 
2007). 
 
 
Figure 1: Per Pupil Expenditure 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Elementary & Secondary Education, School/District Profiles, 2008-09 
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Figure 2: Teacher Salaries 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Elementary & Secondary Education, School/District Profiles, 2008-09 
Figure 3: Graduation Rates Source: Massachusetts Department of Elementary & Secondary Education, School/District Profiles, 2008-09 
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The interplay of race, class, and housing patterns is complex, and there is no suggestion that the 
situation is the result of current and deliberate invidious discrimination.  Springfield may be the 
site of what Chang (1983) calls “third order segregation,” where it is simply the policy of 
assigning students on the basis of their neighborhood that produces segregated schools, without 
present – or perhaps even past – discriminatory intent (p. 26).  Nevertheless, Springfield’s public 
schools are almost as racially homogeneous as they would be under an overtly discriminatory 
system.  This educational segregation is not only a problem in and of itself; it also contributes to 
the under-education of students of color.  
Since the Brown decision, it has become well established that separate is inherently unequal in 
the realm of education, and that a state that permits segregated schooling is under-serving its 
students of color.  Stigma and racial isolation serve to perpetuate a caste system, causing “poor 
students from caste minority groups to disengage from the schooling process early on” (Beirda, 
2011, p. 70). Conversely, student performances tend to improve in racially balanced schools 
(Ipka, 2003, p. 303). The overlap between race and class, and the need to determine the 
underlying causes of residential segregation, do not alter this simple fact: The de facto 
segregation of Springfield’s public schools stands as a barrier that prevents students of color 
from enjoying their full constitutional right to an education.   
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Cumulatively, several public policies are having a negative effect on all students in Springfield’s 
public schools.  But those policies are having a disparate impact on Springfield’s students of 
color.  Students of color are members of a protected class and come within the scope of our 
state’s anti-discrimination statute, M.G.L. c. 151B.  They also have an equal protection claim 
under Amendment 106 of the Massachusetts Constitution.  Together the Constitution and 
Chapter 151B put the burden of remedying the discrimination on the commonwealth as a whole, 
not simply on Springfield’s city council and mayor.  So the policy problem that we seek to 
address is an incontrovertibly public one, a classic example of government failure. 
Background 
The City of Springfield 
In terms of race and ethnicity, Springfield is more diverse than the state as a whole. A little over 
half the population (51.8%) is White compared to the statewide figure of 76.1%, with 38.8% of 
the population Hispanic/Latino and 22.3% Black/African American (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
2010). Springfield is one of the poorest communities in Massachusetts.  Compared with 
Massachusetts as a whole, the Springfield school district has three times as many families living 
below the poverty level.  Although it is the source of most of the jobs in the Pioneer Valley, it 
also has the region’s highest unemployment rate (see Figure 4).  In addition to poverty and 
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unemployment, another issue Springfield suffers from is crime.  In 2008, Springfield had the 
state’s second highest crime count (1,901) and the third highest violent crime rate (1,261.9 per 
10,000 persons) (Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, Research & 
Policy Analysis Division, 2009).   
 
 
Figure 4: Unemployment 
Source: Massachusetts Executive Office of Labor and Workforce Development, Labor Market Information 
City Government 
The city’s form of government is a sign both of Springfield’s record of racial disparity and of 
Black and Hispanic success in choosing and winning strategic battles.  In 2009, after several 
years of voting-rights litigation, stalled legislation, and referenda, Springfield switched from an 
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exclusively at-large form of city government to a mixed system whereby the voters elect eight 
councilors by ward and five at large.  This change came about while the control board was in 
charge, and only after the judge in the federal voting-rights case hinted at his likely ruling should 
the Legislature fail to pass the necessary legislation.5 The school committee has six members.  
Voters elect two members at large and the remainder via four districts (each district comprising 
two city-council wards).  The mayor serves for a term of four years and chairs the school 
committee.   
Six District Plan 
In 1965 the Legislature passed the Racial Imbalance Act under which a school is “racially 
imbalanced” if “more than fifty percent of the pupils attending such school are non-white” 
(M.G.L. c. 71, §37D).  To promote the statute’s objective, in 1973-4 the Massachusetts Board of 
Education commissioned both a short-term and a long-term plan to achieve racial balance in 
Springfield’s public schools.  The result was the Six District Plan, which attempted to reduce 
segregation by intra-district transfers and creating an additional district (Massachusetts Advisory 
Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976).  Notably, it was in 1978, during the 
Six District Plan litigation and in the midst of the Boston busing controversy, that the voters 
ratified a constitutional amendment, Article 111, which provides: “No student shall be assigned 
                                               
5
 Peter Vickery’s recollection of events and of his conversations with the participants. 
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to or denied admittance to a public school on the basis of race, color, national origin or creed.”  
This constitutional prohibition remains in full force and effect and, along with the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, it constrains the range of policy options that are 
available to remedy de facto educational segregation in Massachusetts. The courts are no longer 
involved in Springfield’s educational decisions and any desegregating effects the Six District 
Plan may have had in the past have now disappeared  (Massachusetts Department of Elementary 
& Secondary Education, 2005).  
Springfield’s Public Schools 
Springfield’s total expenditure in 2008-09 was $413,837,614, and its per-pupil spending was 
$14,345 (Massachusetts Department of Elementary & Secondary Education, 2009).  For FY’11 
the district received combined federal and state funding of $273,104,090, an amount equal to 
more than half the district’s FY’09 total expenditure (Massachusetts Department of Elementary 
and Secondary Education, 2011). Despite this indisputably large amount of money, the school 
system is not meeting the standards that parents and students have every right to expect.  The 
federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) established standards for annual yearly progress 
(AYP) in 2003.  Seven years on, Springfield has not yet met the statute’s AYP criteria 
(Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2011). 
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There are three charter schools in Springfield and 45 non-charter public schools, ten of which are 
Level 4 schools.  A school qualifies for Level 4 status if it is “both low performing on the 
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) over a four year period… and not 
showing signs of substantial improvement over that time” (Massachusetts Department of 
Elementary & Secondary Education, 2011).  Springfield students perform significantly lower on 
MCAS tests than their peers in the state.  Only 37% of students in Springfield scored proficient 
or advanced for English Language Arts and 27% for Math, compared to 68% and 59%, 
respectively, at the state level.  
Most of the students in Springfield’s public schools are non-White.  Of the approximately 25,000 
students, about 22% are African-American/Black, 58% are Hispanic/Latino, and 15% are White 
(see Figure 5).  For example, in Springfield’s High School of Commerce – a Level 4 school – 
approximately 62% of the students are Hispanic and most students either have limited 
proficiency in English or do not speak English as their first language.  The 2010 drop-out rate 
among Commerce’s Hispanic students was 37.6% and among limited-English students it was 
53.5% (Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2011). 
In Springfield, 84.2% of students are eligible for free or reduced priced lunch, significantly 
higher than the surrounding school districts and the state level of 34.2% (School District Profiles, 
2011) (see Figure 6).  Graduation rates in Springfield are well below those for neighboring 
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communities in the Pioneer Valley (see Figure 3). Student to teacher ratios are on a par with 
other Pioneer Valley communities, and are somewhat better than the ratios for Longmeadow, 
Northampton, and the state as a whole (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 5: Enrollment by race 
Source: (Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2011) 
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Figure6: Students Eligible for NSLP 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Elementary & Secondary Education, School/District Profiles, 2010-11 
 
Figure 7: Student:Teacher Ratios 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Elementary & Secondary Education, School/District Profiles, 2008-09 
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Policy Criteria 
In our analysis we employ the criteria that Rossell (1993) recommends specifically for 
evaluating school desegregation policies: equity, efficiency, effectiveness and political 
feasibility.   
Effectiveness 
Effectiveness refers to “the extent to which a policy achieves its goals” and differs from 
efficiency in that it is a measure of the alternative actually attaining its desired goal as opposed to 
the costs of reaching the goal (Rossell, 1993, p.164). The alternatives proposed in this analysis 
seek to be effective by achieving economic integration and racial desegregation. 
Equity 
Rossell (1993) points out that, in the U.S. “equity is synonymous with social justice rather than 
equality” (p. 162).  In the context of education, because of the history of state-sanctioned Jim 
Crow, equity and equality are inextricably interlaced.  Here in Massachusetts, policymakers have 
already decided that racially-imbalanced schools are unjust, reflecting the Brown principle that in 
education separate is inherently unequal. 
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Efficiency  
According to Rossell (1993) “policies that achieve more of a desired goal at less cost are more 
efficient than those that achieve the same goal at greater cost or less of a goal at the same cost” 
(p.163). Accordingly, we can measure efficiency by looking at the extent to which an alternative 
brings Springfield closer to the requirements of the Racial Balance Law, measured against the 
costs of implementation. 
Political Feasibility 
One feature that is crucial to the success or failure of any policy alternative is whether or not the 
alternative is politically feasible.  For the purpose of this analysis, we consider political 
feasibility in the context of the “support, goals, and values” of the key actors within the 
government, community, business, and organizational entities that the proposal would affect 
(Meltsner, 1972, p. 859).   
Proposals 
This report examines three proposals: (1) an inter-district magnet school; (2) an investigation by 
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination; and (3) a revitalized METCO program.  
We measure them against the four criteria discussed above (see Appendix A for a table of our 
analysis). 
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1. Inter-District Magnet School 
A magnet school is a public school with a specialized theme, such as arts, science, or information 
technology. Some scholars believe that inter-district magnet schools “provide more racially 
integrated experiences than students’ home districts do [and] they… tend to offer more 
supportive environments for learning and foster more cross-cultural skills” (Orfield,2010, p. 26). 
Currently in Massachusetts, a magnet school is open only to students who reside within the home 
district.  Our proposal would adapt the current model by eliminating the in-district attendance 
boundaries.  By establishing a magnet school open to students neighboring districts Springfield 
could attract students from wealthier, majority-White communities such as Longmeadow and 
Wilbraham.  These communities currently receive METCO students from Springfield and the 
inter-district magnet school alternative is an attempt to encourage a more balanced two-way 
exchange.   
This proposal has its roots in the State of Connecticut’s response to a 1996 court decision, Sheff 
v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267. In Sheff, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that by creating local 
school districts the state had helped concentrate racial minorities in Hartford.  The Connecticut 
Supreme Court instructed the lower court to retain jurisdiction over the case while the executive 
and legislative branches devised solutions.   
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The Sheff case arrived at a settlement in 2008 with the state agreeing to develop a comprehensive 
management plan and a regional school choice office to oversee it.  In the meantime, soon after 
the 1996 decision, the governor had set up an educational improvement panel which included 
giving school boards the option of creating inter-district magnet schools (Sheff v. O'Neill, 1999).   
The City of Hartford, regional magnet district, and suburbs currently operate 26 charter schools 
with the express goal of racially integrating urban and suburban schools.  Springfield could 
follow suit, albeit on a smaller scale, by setting up one magnet school subject to city control, as 
opposed to control by a regional inter-district office.  Maintaining the city’s jurisdiction over the 
school would help ensure its political feasibility. 
Effectiveness 
Danger, both real and perceived, constitutes a significant deterrent to parents who might 
otherwise wish to send their children to a public school in Springfield.  Although it is not as 
pervasive as the public might think, drug-related gang violence in Springfield is real, and it 
sometimes claims the lives of school-age young people in Springfield.  Springfield is home to 
two of the street gangs that the law enforcement includes in its Top Three Security Threat 
Groups.  Inter-gang rivalry has led to shootings, beatings, and arrests, which have garnered 
publicity in the local media (Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, 
2011; The Republican, April 27, 2008).  
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A first-rate, specialty-themed school might help some parents from neighboring communities 
overcome their reluctance to send their children to school in Springfield.  Without suggesting 
that one inter-district magnet school could transform the whole district, correcting the racial and 
socio-economic skew of the city and its schools, there is reason to believe that it could lead to 
some degree of both integration and educational opportunity.  
Precedents from other jurisdictions are cause for caution, however.  While this would be a first 
for Massachusetts, there is some evidence from Texas that inter-district charter schools “do not 
expand interracial contact but instead on average lead to increased racial segregation” 
(Hanushek, 2009, p. 377).  Closer to home, Hartford’s record of racial and socio-economic 
integration through this method is mixed.  Greater educational opportunity seems to be a feature 
of Hartford’s inter-district magnet schools, but the enrollments remain disproportionately non-
White (A Visual Guide to Sheff vs. O’Neill School Desegregation, 2006).  With approximately 
40% of the minority students living in the suburbs, not the city, it is clear that the program is not 
leading to as much socio-economic integration as policymakers had hoped.   
In short, the most an inter-district magnet school could promise in the short-term would be one 
school within Springfield that was slightly more racially diverse than the other 40-plus schools in 
the district.  Over the longer-term, however, depending on its success in attracting a more 
racially-balanced student body, the school could produce knock-on effects within and beyond 
69 
 
Springfield.  If this school flourishes – if the students it serves excel academically regardless of 
race and class – policymakers will have good cause for replicating it. Due to these factors, this 
proposal ranks “good” for effectiveness. 
Equity 
 Under the simplest definition of equity the proposal falls short because only students attending 
the inter-district magnet school would have the full benefit of it.  On the other hand, if the 
proposal succeeds and leads to replication, there would be more widespread advantages over 
time.  This more expansive standard brings us to a better context-specific measure of equity. 
While an inter-district magnet school would help empower Springfield’s low-income families of 
color by providing them with more choice than they would have under a mandatory reassignment 
plan, there are “defects” that make the proposal’s “equity superiority more muddled” (Rossell, 
1993, p. 170).  The two drawbacks that Rossell (1993) identifies are elitism, because the school 
caters to non-minority students from more affluent neighborhoods and the sense of “part-time 
integration” (p. 170).  For these reasons, inter-district magnets score a “moderate” ranking for 
equity. 
Efficiency  
Compared to mandatory reassignment plans, magnet schools have historically appeared more 
efficient in that “[m]ost of the students… do indeed show up” (Rossell, 1993, p. 171).  White 
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loss is not a factor. A voluntary, inter-district magnet school would be less costly than years of 
litigation, which is a likely alternative if the state continues to oversee a system that so clearly 
violates the equal-protection rights of Springfield’s Latino and African-American students.  
Protracted courtroom battles may well be the price for letting present trends continue and, 
weighed against that, an inter-district magnet school would satisfy the efficiency criterion. 
That said, given that the district is trying to organize around the Springfield Improvement 
Framework, administrators might see an inter-district magnet school as a distraction and, more 
important, a competitor for resources.  Nevertheless, by using existing facilities, staff, and 
institutions – as opposed to creating a new inter-district agency – the magnet school need not 
impose any additional costs on the city or state.  Policymakers could minimize any transactional 
costs by making the key funding decisions prior to implementation. 
Another efficiency factor would be the extent to which the city and state would need to devote 
resources to popularizing the magnet school among Springfield’s Black and Latino families, and 
among White families in neighboring communities.  Existing programs, such as the state’s long-
running program METCO, may work in conjunction with this alternative, offering another 
possible school that can serve the applicants. Inter-district magnets are, therefore, a “good” 
proposal in terms of efficiency. 
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Political Feasibility 
As a voluntary measure, the constitutional ban on assigning students on the basis of race does not 
come into play.  An inter-district magnet school would not, therefore, be liable to courtroom 
attack, at least not on the basis of Amendment 111.  Because establishing an inter-district magnet 
school would require legislation and the support of the Department of Elementary and Secondary 
Education, the proposal depends on both the Legislature and the Governor.  If the members of 
Springfield’s legislative delegation were actively opposed, the Governor, Senate President, and 
Speaker would all have to spend some political capital to move the measure forward.  However, 
if the measure was supported by Springfield’s city councilors and school-committee members it 
might encounter only minimal resistance from the state representatives and senators.  
Much would depend on how successful proponents were at building support at the city-council 
level.  Devoid as it is of any hint of coercion, it is not an inherently risky measure politically 
speaking.  But, absent sufficient groundwork beforehand, the putative allocation of resources to a 
specialized magnet school (one designed to attract non-Springfield students) might rile city 
residents and, perhaps, their elected representatives.  The mere perception that city and state 
politicians were lavishing resources on a single school – to the benefit of wealthier suburban 
communities and to the detriment of Springfield’s struggling schools – could present a public-
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relations challenge.  Due to its novelty as a program, requiring action by the Legislature, this 
proposal ranks “moderate” for political feasibility. 
2. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) 
There is no lack of good ideas about tackling residential and education segregation in 
Springfield.  What the community often lacks is an effective vehicle for moving good ideas from 
the drafting table to enactment at something faster than a glacial pace.  As the ward-
representation case shows, even when the community organizes, lobbies, and litigates at length, 
meaningful change only comes when an outside actor (such as the control board) joins the fight.   
This proposal would introduce a new actor to serve as the vehicle for eliciting ideas, turning 
them into legislative proposals, and driving them forward.  The state has a duty to remedy the 
ongoing denial of equal educational opportunity to Springfield’s students of color, and to tackle 
the underlying problem of residential segregation.  The Massachusetts Commission against 
Discrimination (MCAD) is a state agency that has a legislative mandate to investigate just such 
instances of discrimination, including its underlying historic causes, and to design remedial 
policies.  Accordingly, we propose that a representative group of plaintiffs file a complaint under 
151B and demand that the MCAD (1) investigate and research the discriminatory impact and (2) 
formulate policies to minimize/eliminate it.   
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Under Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 151B, the MCAD has a broad remit.  Its task is not simply to 
adjudicate disputes and render decisions like a regular court.  It also has the “authority to issue 
such publications and such results of investigations and research as in its judgment will tend to 
promote good will and minimize or eliminate discrimination” and the duty to “formulate policies 
to effectuate the purposes of this chapter and may make recommendations to agencies and 
officers of the commonwealth or its political subdivisions in aid of such policies and purposes” 
(M.G.L. c. 151B, Sections 2 and 3). 
What might the MCAD propose?  One possibility is inclusionary zoning subject to regional (as 
opposed to city-level) control.  This would get at the problem that underlies school segregation, 
namely residential segregation.  Community members will be able to present the MCAD with 
examples of inclusionary housing policies that have tackled segregation in combination with 
other urban/suburban challenges (e.g. sprawl) such as Oregon’s comprehensive land use 
legislation (Orfield, 2006).  A home-grown analogy to Oregon’s Land Conservation and 
Development Commission would be the Cape Cod Commission, which reviews and regulates 
development in Barnstable County to protect the natural beauty of the landscape.   
One of the policies that the MCAD committee could recommend to the Legislature via the 
Governor might be a regional commission covering Hampden and Hampshire counties, with 
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exclusive jurisdiction over land-use decisions and the power to reject land-use proposals that 
would perpetuate racial and income-based segregation.   
Why not simply offer regional inclusionary zoning as a proposal?  First, because we believe that 
policymakers need to know the causes of segregation—its historic roots—before they can create 
effective solutions.  Springfield’s segregated schools are a product of a segregated community, 
and it is essential to understand how residential segregation arose in Springfield in the first place, 
whether it was through the restriction of affordable housing to certain areas, discriminatory 
steering on the part of real-estate agents, zoning bylaws, decisions by developers and their 
political allies, redlining, or some combination of those factors.  Any investigative committee 
that the MCAD convenes should include people whose specialty is causation (e.g. historians), as 
well as educators, planners, and fair-housing experts, and should ensure that the investigative 
process is methodologically and legislatively sound.  
Secondly, we aim to build a better process.  Our MCAD proposal offers a vehicle for moving 
policy proposals from the community to the Governor and legislative leadership in a way that 
bypasses the traditional roadblocks, namely the city council and local legislators.  
Effectiveness 
Under this proposal, there would be no quick fix to the problem of segregation.  The 
investigative and policy-formulating process would likely take several years.  However, the 
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terms of engagement would be such that the MCAD would have to produce a raft of policy 
proposals that would, ultimately, put an end to de facto segregation and guarantee students of 
color their full constitutional rights.  As for proposals that the MCAD might generate in 
collaboration with the community, e.g. inclusionary zoning and regional planning, there would 
be considerable resistance from the city council and local legislators.  However, recent 
experience suggests that resistance from those actors would not prevent action.  In 2004, when 
Springfield approached financial meltdown, during the FBI’s corruption investigations, the 
Governor and legislative leadership imposed a control board despite opposition from councilors 
and local legislators.  The MCAD and Governor are best placed to persuade the Legislature that, 
like the city’s financial crisis, Springfield’s segregation has statewide impacts and that a regional 
body, outside the control of the city council, is part of the solution. Despite the time to 
implementation, this proposal, for its long term impact on segregation, ranks “good”.   
Equity 
If successful, the complaint would shift the power dynamic. Instead of ad hoc groups of 
volunteers coming up with proposals and asking state actors to adopt them, the people most 
directly affected would be demanding that their government devise remedies for problems for 
which the state is legally responsible.  However, the investigative and policy-development 
process would consume years rather than months, during which time policymakers might use it 
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as cover for inaction. A MCAD investigation ranks “good” for increasing equity for 
Springfield’s minority population. 
Efficiency 
The Commonwealth, through the MCAD, has the resources to investigate the causes thoroughly 
and to recommend concrete remedial legislative and budgetary proposals. The MCAD’s annual 
funding is approximately $4.5 million and it is not likely that the investigation would require a 
significant amount of additional funding (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2010). The long-
term costs of this proposal are currently indeterminable, however costs could skyrocket 
depending on proposals and any litigation that comes as a result.  Therefore, the MCAD 
investigation ranks “moderate” for efficiency. 
Political Feasibility 
To set the process in motion, no executive order or legislation is necessary.  Parents and students 
would initiate the process by filing a complaint at the Springfield office of the MCAD, with 
supporting studies from the Mauricio Gaston Institute and the Center for Public Policy and 
Administration.  The Legislature moves on stage only when the MCAD has completed its 
investigation and fashioned its legislative remedies.  This proposal would simply require the 
MCAD to act on its existing legislative authority by investigating both the historical causes of 
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residential segregation in Springfield and the causes of the Commonwealth’s failure to provide 
students of color with an adequate education.   
Because the state’s constitutional duty is already well established, the complainants would not be 
asking the Commission to break new ground.  But in the event that the MCAD refused to 
investigate, the complainants could ask the courts for an order compelling the agency to 
undertake the investigation.  It seems reasonable to believe that the Commissioners (and the 
Governor) would prefer to avoid such an order, and would be more likely to conduct the 
investigation willingly.  Looking ahead, although the Governor appoints the Commissioners and 
would bear some political responsibility for their recommendations, albeit attenuated, by the time 
the investigation is complete Governor Patrick’s second term will have concluded.  The task of 
presenting the MCAD’s recommendations to the Legislature would fall to his successor.       
This proposal shifts responsibility upward from the city to the state level, with obvious appeal to 
the mayor, city council, and school committee, at least in the short term.  On the other hand, 
these actors might fear that the investigation itself will raise expectations and that the 
recommendations will empower a traditionally quiescent segment of the voting-age population.  
Similarly, if the MCAD considers the inclusionary zoning/regional planning proposal, some 
councilors will undoubtedly voice strong opposition.  But filing a motion to intervene in the 
proceedings in order to prevent the MCAD conducting its investigation at all would require 
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considerable courage, risk-taking, and unified collective action on the part of local elected 
officials, so this outcome seems only a remote possibility.   
In summary, the MCAD proposal puts the onus on an unelected body that is traditionally subject 
to little overt political interference.  Accordingly, it demands no immediate legislative action and 
no expenditure of political capital on the part of elected officials at the city or statewide level, 
and therefore ranks “excellent” for this criterion. 
3. Metropolitan Council for Educational opportunity (METCO) 
The 44-year old METCO program is a relation of Chapter 76, §12A, which complements 
Chapter 71, §37D (the Racial Imbalance Act).  It allows non-White students from districts where 
a racial imbalance exists to attend schools in other districts, and its goal is to provide 
participating students with greater educational opportunity.  Most METCO students from the 
sending districts are Black (75%) or Hispanic (17%) and most students in the receiving districts 
are White (METCO Council for Educational Opportunity, Inc., n.d).  METCO is available in 
Springfield, applicants are selected through a lottery drawing, and families must reapply every 
year (C. Mahoney, personal communication, May 6, 2011).  
METCO is funded through “a state appropriation grant” that is based on the prior year’s 
enrollment figures (Massachusetts Department of Elementary & Secondary Education, 2007).  
The cost of the METCO program in FY’11 was $16,489,123 and the request for FY’12 is close 
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to $17 million (Massachusetts Department of Elementary & Secondary Education, 2011). In 
F’08, the allotted grant amount was $5,828 was divided into $4,000 for an instructional 
allotment, and $1,828 for transportation costs (Massachusetts Department of Elementary & 
Secondary Education, 2007). The Springfield METCO program recently received a sizable grant 
to help expand its reach to Springfield’s students (C. Mahoney, personal communication, May 6, 
2011).  
Springfield’s METCO program serves 150 students in kindergarten through grade twelve in 
Springfield and averages approximately 250 applications per year (C. Mahoney, personal 
communication, May 6, 2011).  The program’s popularity in the Springfield community is 
evident, according to the Director of the Springfield METCO program the families whose 
children are not selected are often emotional and upset (C. Mahoney, personal communication, 
May 6, 2011). 
A comparison of the figures between Boston’s METCO program and Springfield’s METCO 
program is deceiving: in 2007 there were 3,274 students participating in the METCO program, 
and 133 of them were from Springfield (METCO Council for Educational Opportunity, n.d.). 
However, this is not because the Springfield community does not use METCO; the low numbers, 
as Mahoney points out, are due to the fact that neighboring schools are not willing to offer more 
of their “seats” to METCO students (personal interview, May 6, 2011).  Figures from 2006 show 
80 
 
that 46 of Springfield’s METCO students went to Longmeadow, 43 to East Longmeadow, 21 to 
Southwick-Tolland, and 18 to Hampden-Wilbraham (Frankemberg, 2007).  
Expanding METCO in Springfield would improve the education of participating students and, 
for those students, would go some way to reducing the effects of de facto segregation. Thus, this 
alternative suggests that the METCO program be expanded to encompass more neighboring 
schools to participate in the program. This can be achieved by increasing the funding each school 
receives per pupil.  
Effectiveness 
The fact that the Boston waiting list for METCO runs into the thousands demonstrates that 
parents perceive the program to be effective, and for past METCO students the program’s effects 
seem to be have been positive (Lang, 2004).  According to the Metropolitan Council for 
Educational Opportunity, Inc. (METCO, Inc.) “educational results lead the list [of dividends]” 
that justify the public spending (p. 1).  The organization states that “92% of the program’s 
graduating seniors (238) indicated their intent of going on to higher education … compare[d] to 
less than 70% of their siblings and friends in Boston, with less than 80% state-wide” (METCO 
Council for Educational Opportunity, Inc., n.d., p. 2).  Therefore, based on the participation of 
the Springfield community, and the positive results witnessed in Boston, we would expect that 
expanding the METCO program in Springfield would be effective in assisting students to move 
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further in their education, while simultaneously achieving integrated classrooms and diverse 
schools; METCO would be ranked “good” on this criterion.  
Equity 
Students of color in Springfield have a right to an education that is equal to their white 
counterparts.  On the whole, White students do not have to undergo the burden of traveling to 
another town for their schooling nor should African-American and Hispanic students who 
happen to live in Springfield.  Proponents of greater integration might well argue that equity for 
Springfield’s students of color means being able to attend good public schools in their home 
district, the same right that White students in the East Longmeadow, Hampden-Wilbraham, 
Longmeadow, and Southwick-Tolland school districts, for example, do enjoy.  Because the 
burden of travel falls on Springfield school-children only, this proposal ranks “poor” in terms of 
equity. 
Efficiency 
METCO is less costly than the school choice programs, appears to improve graduation rates 
among participating students, and does not appear to have a negative impact on the test scores of 
non-METCO students in the receiving districts (Lang, 2004). With respect to the Racial Balance 
Law, the alternative receives a moderate ranking: the grant money can help METCO serve a 
greater number of students and achieve a greater level of integration because the increased 
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funding may serve as an incentive for schools to agree to receive more students. The proposed 
alternative is efficient in that it is less costly than other policies, and because this alternative is 
voluntary, it complies with the Racial Balance in law in that it does not assign students to schools 
based on their race, therefore and would receive a “good” ranking on  this criterion. 
 
Political Feasibility 
That METCO has been able to survive for more than four decades, becoming an apparently 
permanent feature of the educational system in Massachusetts, shows that the support for any 
expansion of it is present at the state level as well as within the Springfield community. Because 
the program recently was awarded a grant, expanding and enhancing it in Springfield would not 
require greater funding from the state in the short term; this creates more support for the 
expansion of the program.  If any political capital is to be spent in this alternative it would be due 
to its implementation, as currently participating school districts must not only agree to take in 
more children, but more school districts must also participate.  For the implementation of this 
alternative to be successful METCO would need to develop partnerships within Springfield and 
within potential and participating school districts in order to have the political influence on their 
school-boards and the legislative representatives of those neighboring cities.  
83 
 
In sum, taking into consideration the recent availability of funding, the program’s long 
history and potential opposition from receiving schools, this alternative would receive a 
“moderate” ranking on this criterion.  
 
 
 
Recommendations 
Decades of laws, customs, and practices on the part of political leaders, banks, real-estate agents, 
and ordinary homebuyers have produced a situation in Springfield familiar in many American 
cities: de facto residential segregation.  The otherwise perfectly sensible policy of assigning 
children to schools on the basis of where they live has created the obvious corollary: de facto 
educational segregation.  Transforming this legacy demands action by many actors along several 
fronts.  The desegregation of Springfield’s public schools requires the desegregation of 
Springfield.  Although all of the alternatives would have a positive effect for students in 
Springfield, we recommend requesting the MCAD to conduct an in-depth investigation into the 
causes of residential segregation in Springfield in order to fashion a raft of policies to promote 
residential desegregation.   
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In the short run, expanding METCO and inter-district magnets would improve integration, 
depending on the number of students served.  This said, expanding METCO would do nothing to 
positively affect schools in Springfield, with grant money and any federal Title I funds following 
the student to the suburban district.  Inter-districts would have the opposite effect, bringing 
additional monies from the affluent suburbs, and possibly the state, into the beleaguered district. 
In terms of short-run costs, MCAD is the least costly up-front, however, policies, and possible 
litigation, in the future have an indeterminable cost.  
All alternatives require state-level action, which is appropriate as the state government should 
remedy its failure to provide the children with a quality education.  However, by requiring state 
action, the proposals broaden the scope of the conflict to a different level.  MCAD, however, 
does a better job of narrowing the scope, as it will be solely focused on the Springfield context. 
Both MCAD and METCO are established line-items in the budget, giving them an advantage 
over inter-districts, which, as a new program, must be approved by the Legislature. 
A large benefit of MCAD is that it is unelected authority with little outside pressure, and 
therefore is most likely to determine proper causation and propose unbiased recommendations to 
remedy segregation. This said, MCAD’s involvement in an investigation on this magnitude is 
unprecedented, which may lead to legal challenges surround the Commission’s authority over 
this issue, and it may not be able to successfully implement policies in a timely manner. While 
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inter-district magnets and expanding METCO are more immediate proposals, the MCAD 
investigation is the only alternative that addresses the underlying issues of segregation in the 
Springfield region. 
 
Conclusion 
Educational segregation is a symptom of a deeply embedded malady, and to provide a cure (not 
simply a bandage) we need the patient’s full medical history.  Otherwise we run the risk of 
treating the symptoms without addressing the disease, or perhaps even making matters worse.  
So rather than Springfield’s leaders merely passing the buck, introducing in the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination is a responsible and good faith effort to call in an actor with 
the necessary expertise and political heft. 
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Appendix A 
Criteria Definition 
Policy Alternatives 
Inter-district Magnet School MCAD Investigation Expand METCO
Effectiveness 
The extent to which a 
policy achieve its goals of 
economic integration and 
desegregation  
Good—Depends on 
implementation, must be in 
safe neighborhood, with 
distinctive theme to attract 
suburban students 
Good—Long run solution, but 
needs several years to 
investigate/implement 
Good—past program’s effects 
have been positive but 
doesn’t make large sca
change
Equity 
The equal distribution of 
education as a good or 
resource 
Moderate—more choices for 
minority but only students 
attending inter-district school 
have benefits 
Moderate –empowers a 
usually quiescent group and is 
only as good as MCAD policy 
proposals.   
Poor—burden of travel placed 
on minority students
Efficiency 
The extent to which a 
policy achieves a goal with 
the least cost to 
implement 
Good—less costly than years 
of litigation, however state 
would need to give extra 
money 
Moderate—within the 
MCAD’s annual funding, but 
indeterminable future costs 
Good—less costly than the 
school choice program
Political feasibility 
The support, goals and 
values of the key actors 
Moderate—constitutional, 
but requires state level action 
by governor and legislature 
Excellent—onus is on an 
unelected body and demands 
no immediate legislative 
action and no expenditure of 
political capital 
Moderate—requires greater 
support of suburban districts
Ranking scale: Poor, Moderate, Good, Excellent 
 
 
